當北京攻擊余茂春 中共如何暴露「台灣問題」的論述困境? / When Beijing Attacks Miles Yu: How the CCP Exposes the Weakness of Its Taiwan Narrative

原文首發於《自由時報》|2025年12月2日|English ↓


在華盛頓,《華盛頓時報》刊登了余茂春的〈中共「統一台灣」神話的十大謬論〉(余本人譯題)後,北京的反應迅速而激烈。11月20日,《人民日報海外版》以罕見的篇幅逐條回擊,指余「惡意攻擊」、「滿紙荒唐」。但若仔細閱讀,就會發現這篇反駁真正展示的,不是台灣問題的「真相」,而是北京敘事體系內部長久存在、卻無法透過宣傳掩蓋的矛盾。對於美國讀者而言,它更像一扇窗口,清楚揭示中共在台灣議題上的焦慮:國際法無法支撐其主張、歷史論述無法自洽,而台灣的民主存在本身,就是對中共政治模式的現實挑戰。

《人民日報》的反駁從一個根本性錯誤出發:它堅持宣稱,「1949 年前台灣主權由中華民國行使,因此1949年PRC成立後自然繼承台灣主權」。這段論述看似連貫,卻違背現代國際法的基本區分——國家繼承(state succession)與政權繼承(government succession)並非一回事。一個新的政權代表「誰是中國」,並不等於自動繼承「中華民國所治理的全部領土」。這是國際法的基礎常識。

更關鍵的是,中華人民共和國自1949年成立以來,從未在台灣行使過一天治理。而國際法對主權聲索的前提,不是歷史敘事,而是effective control(有效統治)。即便不討論 1951 年《舊金山和約》沒有將台灣「交給任何國家」,單就事實而言,北京從未在台灣落地實施司法、行政、稅制或任何形式的治理,也無法依國際法主張主權。

《人民日報》在反駁中還刻意扭曲聯合國第2758號決議的內容,暗示此決議確認台灣屬於PRC。然而,當時美國駐聯合國大使 George H. W. Bush 與其後多任美國政府皆明確指出:2758號決議僅決定「誰代表中國」,完全未處理台灣地位問題。也就是說,它既沒有將台灣歸屬 PRC,也沒有確認 PRC 對台灣的主權。因此,北京的「繼承論」實際上是一種循環論證:

「我們繼承台灣 → 因為台灣屬於我們 → 所以我們繼承台灣。」

這既不符合法律,也不符合現實,只是北京敘事體系內部自我重複的政治邏輯。

接著,《人民日報》對台灣現代國家意識的否定,進一步暴露了它對當代國家理論的陌生與不安。文章嘲諷余茂春「台灣國家意識源於 1980 年代民主化」的說法,稱這是「荒誕的政治新論」。但在學術世界,這恰恰是顯而易見的事實:現代國家認同並非源自血緣與語言,而來自政治制度與民主參與。

無論是 Benedict Anderson 的「想像的共同體」,還是對波羅的海國家、烏克蘭、新加坡的研究,都表明制度變革常常是國家意識誕生的關鍵時刻。台灣在戒嚴解除、黨禁解禁、總統直選的過程中形成自我主體性,是典型的現代國家政治化路徑。北京拒絕承認這一點,不是因為不了解理論,而是因為民主所帶來的政治合法性,是其無法控制、無法複製、也無法阻止的。

當《人民日報》企圖以國際法反駁余文時,更顯得心虛。它將 2016 年《南海仲裁案》的 PCA 仲裁庭稱為「草台班子」,卻不提中國自己是《聯合國海洋法公約》(UNCLOS)的簽署國,必須接受該仲裁框架。仲裁中確立的關鍵原則——「歷史權利不能構成現代主權依據」——正是北京不敢面對的核心。因為同理,關於台灣的「歷史敘事」也無法構成主權主張。這類情緒化否認法律程序的方式,可能在中國國內有效,但對熟悉國際條約體系的美國讀者而言,只會進一步暴露北京的邏輯無法在國際環境中站穩腳跟。

《人民日報》將「和平統一」包裝為「大國胸懷」,但 PRC 所謂「和平」從未脫離脅迫前提。《反分裂國家法》公開寫明「必要時將採取非和平方式」,而2022年《台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業》白皮書更強調「一國兩制」是唯一方案,不容談判。這種帶有威脅的「和平」,在國際關係文獻中有一個明確的名字:coercive diplomacy(脅迫式外交)。它不是和平,而是一種帶著強制預設的政治安排。

至於台灣的示範效應,北京在反駁中選擇了用台灣「綠色恐怖」、「政治混亂」的描述來掩蓋民主的成功,而不是討論制度的差異。這種敘事方式的本質不是解釋台灣,而是讓大陸觀眾相信:民主無法運作、華人社會不適合自由,而台灣的一切繁榮與自治,都必須被抹黑以避免「示範效應」的擴散。事實上,台灣在 Freedom House、V-Dem 等國際民主持制指數中的高排名,是北京無法以宣傳掩蓋的制度現實。

至於《人民日報》指控「西方代言人」「虛假宣傳網絡」,則是將自由社會中多元聲音誤讀為「敵對行動」。而學界對中國海外影響力行動的研究,如ASPI、CSIS、German Marshall Fund都是公開、透明、可驗證的資料,跟北京指控的「抹黑造謠」完全不同。

總體而言,北京給余茂春貼上的指控標籤——「荒唐」、「反華」、「惡意」——反而更像中共敘事脆弱性的投射。當一個政權面對外部批評時,無法用事實回應,而只能借由政治標籤與情緒性指控反擊,其真正受損的不是批評者,而是自身的敘事結構。台灣議題之所以在國際社會越來越受到關注,就是因為每一次北京試圖「反駁」,都進一步揭示其敘事與現代國際秩序之間的斷裂。

換言之,《人民日報》的文章並沒有駁倒余文,相反,它讓全球讀者更看清北京對國際法的不安、對現代國家理論的陌生、對民主示範效應的恐懼、以及對自身敘事無法自圓其說的焦慮。台灣問題之所以重大,並非因為地理,而是因為它將威權敘事與國際規則、自由制度之間的張力暴露無遺——而中共越是急切反駁,這一點就越清晰。


When Beijing Attacks Miles Yu: How the CCP Exposes the Weakness of Its Taiwan Narrative

First published in the Liberty Times | December 2, 2025

In Washington, after The Washington Times published Miles Yu’s piece on ten fallacies in the CCP’s myth of “reunifying Taiwan,” Beijing’s reaction was swift and fierce. On November 20, the People’s Daily overseas edition devoted unusual space to a point-by-point rebuttal, accusing Yu of “malicious attacks” and “utter absurdity.” Read closely, though, the rebuttal reveals not the “truth” about the Taiwan question but contradictions that have long existed inside Beijing’s narrative and that propaganda cannot cover up. For American readers, it is more like a window that shows clearly the CCP’s anxiety over Taiwan: international law cannot support its claim, its historical argument is not internally consistent, and Taiwan’s democratic existence is itself a real-world challenge to the CCP’s political model.

The People’s Daily rebuttal starts from a fundamental error. It insists that “before 1949 Taiwan’s sovereignty was exercised by the Republic of China, so after the PRC was founded in 1949 it naturally inherited sovereignty over Taiwan.” The argument looks coherent, but it violates a basic distinction in modern international law: state succession and government succession are not the same thing. A new government representing “who China is” does not automatically inherit “all the territory governed by the Republic of China.” That is elementary international law.

More important, since its founding in 1949 the PRC has never governed Taiwan for a single day. Under international law, the premise of a sovereignty claim is not a historical narrative but effective control. Even setting aside the fact that the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty did not “hand Taiwan to any country,” Beijing has, as a matter of fact, never exercised judicial, administrative, fiscal or any other form of governance on the ground in Taiwan, and so cannot claim sovereignty under international law.

In its rebuttal, the People’s Daily also deliberately distorts UN Resolution 2758, implying that it confirmed Taiwan belongs to the PRC. Yet George H. W. Bush, then U.S. ambassador to the UN, and many U.S. administrations since have made clear that Resolution 2758 decided only “who represents China” and did not address Taiwan’s status at all. In other words, it neither assigned Taiwan to the PRC nor confirmed the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing’s “succession theory” is therefore circular reasoning:

“We inherited Taiwan → because Taiwan belongs to us → so we inherited Taiwan.”

That is consistent with neither law nor reality. It is merely a political logic that repeats itself inside Beijing’s narrative system.

Next, the People’s Daily’s denial of Taiwan’s modern national consciousness further exposes its unfamiliarity with, and unease about, contemporary theories of the nation. The article mocks Yu’s point that “Taiwan’s national consciousness grew out of democratization in the 1980s,” calling it “an absurd new political theory.” But in academia this is plainly obvious: modern national identity comes not from blood and language but from political institutions and democratic participation.

From Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” to studies of the Baltic states, Ukraine and Singapore, research shows that institutional change is often the decisive moment when national consciousness is born. Taiwan formed its own sense of agency through the lifting of martial law, the legalization of opposition parties and direct presidential elections — a textbook path of modern national politicization. Beijing refuses to admit this not because it does not understand the theory, but because the political legitimacy democracy brings is something it cannot control, cannot copy and cannot stop.

When the People’s Daily tries to use international law against Yu, it sounds even less sure of itself. It calls the PCA tribunal in the 2016 South China Sea arbitration a “makeshift troupe,” without mentioning that China itself is a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and bound by its arbitration framework. A key principle established in that ruling — that historic rights cannot serve as a basis for modern sovereignty — is exactly what Beijing dares not face, because by the same logic, a “historical narrative” about Taiwan cannot support a sovereignty claim either. This kind of emotional rejection of legal process may work at home, but to American readers familiar with the treaty system, it only further shows that Beijing’s logic cannot stand up internationally.

The People’s Daily dresses up “peaceful reunification” as the “magnanimity of a great power,” but the PRC’s so-called “peace” has never been free of coercion. The Anti-Secession Law openly states that “non-peaceful means” will be used “if necessary,” and the 2022 white paper The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era stresses that “one country, two systems” is the only option and is not open to negotiation. In the international relations literature, this kind of “peace” backed by threats has a clear name: coercive diplomacy. It is not peace but a political arrangement with coercion built in.

As for Taiwan’s demonstration effect, Beijing’s rebuttal chose to cover up democracy’s success by describing Taiwan in terms of “green terror” and “political chaos,” rather than discussing the differences between the two systems. The point of this narrative is not to explain Taiwan but to convince mainland audiences that democracy does not work, that Chinese societies are unsuited to freedom, and that all of Taiwan’s prosperity and self-government must be smeared to stop the “demonstration effect” from spreading. In fact, Taiwan’s high rankings in international democracy indices such as those of Freedom House and V-Dem are an institutional reality Beijing cannot hide with propaganda.

As for the People’s Daily’s accusations about “Western mouthpieces” and “fake propaganda networks,” they misread the plurality of voices in a free society as “hostile action.” Academic research on China’s overseas influence operations — by ASPI, CSIS and the German Marshall Fund, for example — is public, transparent and verifiable, entirely unlike the “smears and rumors” Beijing alleges.

Overall, the labels Beijing pinned on Yu — “absurd,” “anti-China,” “malicious” — look more like a projection of the fragility of the CCP’s own narrative. When a regime faced with outside criticism cannot answer with facts and can only fire back with political labels and emotional accusations, what is really damaged is not the critic but its own narrative structure. The Taiwan issue is drawing more and more international attention precisely because every time Beijing tries to “rebut,” it further reveals the rupture between its narrative and the modern international order.

In other words, the People’s Daily article did not refute Yu. On the contrary, it let readers around the world see more clearly Beijing’s unease about international law, its unfamiliarity with modern theories of the nation, its fear of democracy’s demonstration effect, and its anxiety that its own narrative does not hold together. The Taiwan question matters not because of geography, but because it lays bare the tension between authoritarian narratives on one side and international rules and free institutions on the other — and the more urgently the CCP rebuts, the clearer that becomes.

蘇查哈爾燦