王毅宣稱「七重鎖定」 北京迄今不敢回答「誰在治理台灣」 / Wang Yi’s “Seven Locks”: The Question Beijing Still Won’t Answer — Who Governs Taiwan?

原文首發於《自由時報》|2025年12月10日|English ↓


中國外長王毅與德國外長會談,再度藉長篇歷史敘事宣稱台灣被「七重鎖定」屬於中國,從《開羅宣言》一路講到二七五八號決議,還指控日本「挑戰戰後秩序」。但是把王毅的發言放回當代國際法與國際關係的脈絡,真正值得注意的並非他列舉多少文件,而是北京為何始終必須依賴這些文本,卻無法回應當今最關鍵的現實:台灣作為現代政治共同體的存在。

王毅的第一個核心敘事是「二戰檔案決定台灣主權」。但《開羅宣言》與《波茨坦公告》都只是政治宣示,而非國際法上具體處分主權的正式條約。真正具有法律效力的是《舊金山和約》,它在一九五一年明確寫下:日本「放棄台灣」,但沒有指定受讓國。北京要引用戰後文件,就不能迴避這份真正的國際法文本。不論中共如何強調「歷史正義」,二戰並沒有給出一份將台灣劃入中華人民共和國主權的法律文書。這是基本事實。

其次,北京依舊把「誰代表中國」與「台灣屬於誰」混為一談。聯合國二七五八號決議的效力,是把「中國席位」從台北轉移到北京,這是代表權問題,而非台灣地位問題。歷任美國政府與多份國際法學者意見都指出:二七五八號決議沒有處理台灣屬於誰。王毅將其敘述為「聯合國已確認台灣是中國一省」,完全不符聯合國的文書內容與執行慣例。他這不是法理,而是政治宣傳。

更關鍵的是,北京始終迴避「有效統治」的國際法核心條件。自一九四九年以來,中華人民共和國從未在台灣行使任何治理權;相反地,台灣擁有成熟的行政體系、軍隊、司法制度與民主機制,更在區域與全球事務中扮演關鍵角色。無論歷史敘事如何的人為鋪陳,都無法改變「誰在治理台灣」這個最實際的主權判斷基礎。

王毅講話最脫離現實的部分,是他對台灣現代主體性的全然忽視。在他的敘述裡,台灣只是歷史上的客體,從未作為「人民」「社會」或「民主實體」出現。這是北京論述的結構性限制:若承認台灣已形成政治共同體,就必須面對民主政治帶來的主體性、民意與正當性。所以,北京只能鑽回過去尋找答案,卻不敢正視台灣的現在。

王毅更將日本當作主要攻擊對象,他點名日本領導人的言論是對「二戰勝利」的挑戰,甚至暗示日本再軍國化的危險,指責日本「借台灣挑釁」,王毅更像是在避免回應真正的國際關切——並非誰在「挑戰中國」,而是北京為何堅持用武力或威脅手段,對一個從未受其統治的社會,主張擁有所有權。還將它偽裝成「維護戰後秩序」,實則與聯合國憲章禁止使用武力的原則相牴觸。

這正是王毅講話最突出的矛盾:北京試圖證明自己在捍衛秩序,卻無法接受台灣人民在現代國際秩序中早已是擁有自主性的參與者。歷史文件可以被引用,但無法取代有效統治、人民意願與國際法框架。王毅想藉過去解決台灣問題,但台灣的問題早已不屬於過去。它屬於當代,而這正是北京最難回答的部分。


Wang Yi’s “Seven Locks”: The Question Beijing Still Won’t Answer — Who Governs Taiwan?

First published in the Liberty Times | December 10, 2025

In talks with Germany’s foreign minister, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi once again used a long historical narrative to claim that Taiwan is “locked in” as part of China seven times over — running from the Cairo Declaration all the way to UN Resolution 2758 — and accused Japan of “challenging the postwar order.” But put Wang’s remarks back in the context of contemporary international law and international relations, and what stands out is not how many documents he lists. It is why Beijing must keep relying on these texts while being unable to respond to the most important reality today: Taiwan’s existence as a modern political community.

Wang’s first core claim is that “World War II documents decided Taiwan’s sovereignty.” But the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation were political statements, not formal treaties that disposed of sovereignty under international law. The document with real legal force is the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which states clearly that Japan “renounces” Taiwan — without naming any recipient. If Beijing wants to cite postwar documents, it cannot avoid this genuine text of international law. However much the CCP stresses “historical justice,” World War II produced no legal instrument placing Taiwan under the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China. That is a basic fact.

Second, Beijing still conflates “who represents China” with “to whom Taiwan belongs.” What Resolution 2758 did was move “China’s seat” from Taipei to Beijing. That is a question of representation, not of Taiwan’s status. Successive U.S. administrations and many international law scholars have pointed out that Resolution 2758 did not address to whom Taiwan belongs. Wang’s description of it as “the UN having confirmed that Taiwan is a province of China” is entirely inconsistent with the text of the resolution and the UN’s practice in applying it. This is not legal reasoning but political propaganda.

Even more important, Beijing keeps dodging the core condition of international law: effective control. Since 1949, the PRC has never exercised any governing authority in Taiwan. Taiwan, by contrast, has a mature administration, armed forces, judiciary and democratic institutions, and plays a key role in regional and global affairs. However artfully a historical narrative is arranged, it cannot change the most practical basis for judging sovereignty: who governs Taiwan.

The part of Wang’s speech most detached from reality is his complete disregard for Taiwan’s modern agency. In his telling, Taiwan is only an object of history; it never appears as a “people,” a “society” or a “democratic entity.” This is a structural limit of Beijing’s narrative: to admit that Taiwan has formed a political community would mean facing the agency, public will and legitimacy that democracy brings. So Beijing can only dig back into the past for answers, and dares not look at Taiwan’s present.

Wang also made Japan his main target. He singled out the Japanese leader’s remarks as a challenge to the “victory in World War II,” even hinted at the danger of Japanese remilitarization, and accused Japan of “using Taiwan to provoke.” He seemed to be avoiding the real international concern — which is not who is “challenging China,” but why Beijing insists on using force or threats to claim ownership of a society it has never ruled. Dressing that up as “defending the postwar order” in fact runs against the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force.

This is the most glaring contradiction in Wang’s remarks: Beijing tries to prove it is defending order, yet cannot accept that the people of Taiwan have long been autonomous participants in the modern international order. Historical documents can be cited, but they cannot replace effective control, the will of the people and the framework of international law. Wang wants to settle the Taiwan question through the past, but Taiwan’s question no longer belongs to the past. It belongs to the present — and that is exactly the part Beijing finds hardest to answer.

蘇查哈爾燦