原文首發於《自由時報》|2026年4月18日|English ↓
長期觀察美中台三角關係,筆者必須直言:國民黨主席鄭麗文訪中與習近平會面,及返台時十五位藍委熱烈擁抱、高喊「和平加油」的場面,看似一場「和平慶功」,實則是一次低姿態的刻意迎合,極易在美國輿論中製造致命誤讀,損害美台戰略關係!
這趟所謂「和平之旅」,時機精準卡在川習會前夕。中共會後立即拋出十項惠台措施,目的清晰:利用台灣在野黨繞過民選政府,向國際釋放「兩岸正走向和解、中國積極求和平」訊號。KMT回應卻是全力配合——鄭麗文感謝北京善意、強調「第一步成功,還有九十九步」,返台機場的擁抱與歡呼,更像一場政治表演,完美契合中共「和戰加壓」的統戰劇本。
在華府眼中,這不是單純黨際交流,而是中共低成本的「B隊操作」。美國智庫大西洋理事會非駐研究員宋文笛明確指出,北京當局將利用鄭習握手照片,向美傳遞「中國仍願意對話、偏好政治途徑而非軍事手段」的訊號,因此美方「沒必要過度關注台灣」或推進軍售。眾議院外交委員會貼出「川普+賴清德」合成照,重申《台灣關係法》是抵禦中共侵略的堡壘。這清楚顯示,華府不會輕易上當,但輿論誤讀一旦擴散,仍會削弱美國國內支持台灣的共識。
更深層問題在於主體性。台灣是印太第一島鏈關鍵民主堡壘,美國投入資源支持自衛,正是因為它代表自由開放的價值。而KMT刻意迎合中共「九二共識、一中框架」,公開展現低姿態,等於自貶台灣作為主體的戰略價值。華府最擔心的是這種行為讓美國承諾顯得尷尬——我們為何要全力軍援一個內部不斷向北京低頭的夥伴?這只會讓中共更容易在國際上宣傳「台灣問題是中國內部事務」,動搖美國對台政策的正當性。
KMT或許自認帶來「和平紅利」,但華府現實評估是:這些措施多為可開可關的經濟閥門,短期利好少數依賴中國的族群,長期卻加劇台灣脆弱性。真正的和平來自實力平衡與民主團結,而非單方面低頭。美國國會持續敦促台灣通過特別國防預算,正是因為清楚中共軍事壓力從未停止。
此次事件再次提醒華府:台灣內部若持續上演這種低姿態迎合,只會混亂美國輿論、猶豫政策,最終受害的是台灣自身。華府不會因此改變對台戰略支持,但台灣必須自省——真正的戰略夥伴,應展現捍衛民主的決心,而非配合對手的劇本。
The KMT’s “Peace Journey” Seen from Washington: The Dangerous Misreading Invited by Kowtowing to Beijing
First published in the Liberty Times | April 18, 2026
Having long watched the U.S.–China–Taiwan triangle, I have to be blunt. KMT chair Cheng Li-wun’s visit to China to meet Xi Jinping — and the scene on her return, with fifteen KMT legislators embracing her and cheering “Go, peace!” — looked like a victory celebration for peace. In reality, it was a deliberate, low-posture act of accommodation that can easily create a fatal misreading in American public opinion and damage the U.S.–Taiwan strategic relationship.
The timing of this so-called “peace journey” was set precisely on the eve of the Trump–Xi summit. Right after the meeting, Beijing rolled out ten measures “benefiting Taiwan.” The aim was clear: use Taiwan’s opposition party to bypass the elected government and signal to the world that “the two sides are moving toward reconciliation and China is actively seeking peace.” The KMT responded with full cooperation. Cheng thanked Beijing for its goodwill and said “the first step has succeeded; there are ninety-nine more to go.” The hugs and cheers at the airport on her return looked more like political theater, fitting perfectly into the CCP’s united front script of mixing peace overtures with pressure.
In Washington’s eyes, this was not simply party-to-party exchange but a low-cost “B-team operation” by the CCP. Wen-Ti Sung, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, pointed out that Beijing will use the photos of Cheng and Xi shaking hands to signal to the U.S. that “China is still willing to talk and prefers political rather than military means” — and therefore that the U.S. “need not pay too much attention to Taiwan” or push ahead with arms sales. The House Foreign Affairs Committee posted a composite photo of Trump and Lai Ching-te, reaffirming that the Taiwan Relations Act is a bulwark against CCP aggression. That shows clearly Washington will not be easily fooled. But once a misreading spreads in public opinion, it can still weaken the consensus in the U.S. for supporting Taiwan.
The deeper problem is agency. Taiwan is a key democratic bulwark in the Indo-Pacific’s first island chain, and the U.S. invests resources in supporting its self-defense precisely because it stands for free and open values. By deliberately catering to the CCP’s “1992 Consensus” and “one China” framework and publicly taking a low posture, the KMT is effectively devaluing Taiwan’s strategic worth as an actor in its own right. What worries Washington most is that this makes America’s commitments look awkward: why should we give full military support to a partner whose own politicians keep bowing to Beijing? It only makes it easier for the CCP to tell the world that “the Taiwan question is China’s internal affair,” shaking the legitimacy of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
The KMT may believe it is bringing a “peace dividend.” But Washington’s realistic assessment is that these measures are mostly economic valves that can be turned on and off. In the short term they benefit a few groups that depend on China; in the long term they make Taiwan more vulnerable. Real peace comes from a balance of power and democratic unity, not from one-sided submission. Congress keeps urging Taiwan to pass its special defense budget precisely because it knows the CCP’s military pressure has never stopped.
This episode is another reminder for Washington: if this kind of low-posture accommodation keeps playing out inside Taiwan, it will only confuse American public opinion and make policy hesitate — and in the end, Taiwan itself will pay. Washington will not change its strategic support for Taiwan because of it, but Taiwan must look hard at itself. A true strategic partner should show resolve in defending democracy, not play along with its adversary’s script.


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