原文首發於《自由時報》|2026年5月31日|English ↓
中國國民黨主席鄭麗文即將踏上美國土地,帶著她精心包裝的「和平使者」形象。但在華盛頓的政策圈裡,這套敘事從一開始就面臨一個根本性的挑戰:她究竟代表誰?
這個問題不是修辭,而是實質性的政治考驗。
她無法代表台灣主流民意!鄭麗文在北京期間,積極呼應「中華民族偉大復興」與「命運共同體」論述,重申貼近北京版本的「九二共識」,並與習近平握手。這些畫面和言論,在台灣內部引發強烈反彈。多數台灣民眾支持維持現狀,堅守民主制度,並期待兩岸交流建立在對等與尊重之上,而非繞過民選政府的黨對黨機制。她在軍購預算上的立場更是與台灣社會防衛意志脫節——當中國軍事壓力持續升高,壓低國防預算投入,在華府眼中無異於主動降低嚇阻。
她也無法代表國民黨內部共識!國民黨內不乏在國防、兩岸路線上與她存在明顯分歧的重量級人物。她的親北京路線是黨內一個派系的立場,而非全黨共識。前任主席朱立倫訪美時還在強調國民黨「永遠親美」,鄭麗文卻在北京的鏡頭前選擇了截然不同的話語框架,這不僅讓華府的觀察者困惑,也讓藍營內部溫和派陷入尷尬。
美國的「台海和平」支持和兩岸政策立場是明確的:尊重台灣民主制度與主流民意、支持台灣強化自我防衛能力、維護印太盟友體系的整體可信度。任何將和平建立在弱化嚇阻、模糊主權論述或單方面對北京示好之上的路徑,在華府都不會獲得實質支持——不論措辭多麼溫和,包裝多麼精緻。
鄭麗文希望此行為二〇二八年總統選戰累積政治資本,向外界證明她能「同時與美中互動」。這個算盤並非不可理解,但風險極高。歷史已經給出警示:類似的路線曾讓國民黨在台灣選舉中付出慘痛代價,因為它高估了台灣選民對「以和平之名換主權退讓」的容忍度,也低估了中間選民對「維持現狀+強化嚇阻」的堅定偏好。
如果鄭麗文在華府繼續以語言修辭替代實質表態,無法清晰闡明國民黨對台灣民主制度、對等原則與防衛能力的堅定承諾,她將面臨雙重失敗:既無法獲得美方高層的實質認可,也將進一步撕裂藍營內部支持,推高二〇二六地方選舉與二〇二八大選的政治風險。
華盛頓不缺來訪的政治人物,也見識過太多精心設計的「和平表態」。這裡比任何地方都看重政治實力和現實,鄭麗文能給出的,究竟是哪一樣?
Whom Does She Represent? Cheng Li-wun’s Washington Problem
First published in the Liberty Times | May 31, 2026
Kuomintang chair Cheng Li-wun is about to set foot in the United States, carrying her carefully packaged image as a “messenger of peace.” But in Washington’s policy circles, that narrative faces a fundamental challenge from the start: whom, exactly, does she represent?
This is not a rhetorical question. It is a real political test.
She cannot represent mainstream opinion in Taiwan. In Beijing, Cheng eagerly echoed the narratives of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and a “community of common destiny,” reaffirmed a “1992 Consensus” close to Beijing’s version, and shook hands with Xi Jinping. Those images and remarks provoked a strong backlash in Taiwan. Most Taiwanese support the status quo, stand by their democracy, and expect cross-strait exchanges to rest on equality and respect — not on party-to-party channels that bypass the elected government. Her position on arms procurement is even further out of step with Taiwanese society’s will to defend itself. As China’s military pressure keeps rising, cutting defense spending looks, from Washington, like voluntarily lowering deterrence.
Nor can she represent a consensus within the KMT. The party has no shortage of heavyweights who clearly disagree with her on defense and cross-strait policy. Her pro-Beijing line is the position of one faction, not of the whole party. Her predecessor, Eric Chu, stressed during his U.S. visit that the KMT is “forever pro-American,” yet in front of Beijing’s cameras Cheng chose an entirely different framework. That not only confuses observers in Washington but also embarrasses the moderates within the blue camp.
America’s position on peace in the Taiwan Strait and on cross-strait policy is clear: respect Taiwan’s democracy and mainstream public opinion, support Taiwan in strengthening its self-defense, and preserve the overall credibility of the Indo-Pacific alliance system. Any path that builds peace on weaker deterrence, blurred sovereignty or one-sided gestures toward Beijing will win no real support in Washington — however mild the wording or polished the packaging.
Cheng hopes this trip will build political capital for the 2028 presidential race and show that she can “engage with both the U.S. and China.” The calculation is understandable, but the risk is high. History has already given a warning: a similar line once cost the KMT dearly at the polls, because it overestimated Taiwanese voters’ tolerance for “trading sovereignty for peace” and underestimated swing voters’ firm preference for “the status quo plus stronger deterrence.”
If Cheng keeps substituting rhetoric for substance in Washington and cannot clearly state the KMT’s firm commitment to Taiwan’s democracy, to equality, and to defense capability, she will fail twice over: she will win no real recognition from senior U.S. officials, and she will further split support within her own camp, raising the political risks for the 2026 local elections and the 2028 presidential race.
Washington has no shortage of visiting politicians, and it has seen plenty of carefully choreographed “peace gestures.” More than anywhere else, it values political strength and reality. Which of the two can Cheng Li-wun offer?


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