原文首發於《自由時報》|2026年6月18日|English ↓
六四三十七週年,恰逢AI開始全面進入大眾生活的第一年。社交媒體的演算法把最新、最熱門、最具爭議性的內容推送到每個人的眼前。於是這幾天,每一次刷新頁面,都能看見不同語言、不同地區的人重新討論這場三十七年前的歷史。
李老師發起「#你沒看過的六四」,讓許多年輕人第一次看見那些從未出現在教科書裡的照片;李厚辰、賈葭、伍雷在日本的討論反覆追問同一個問題:「如果一個社會已經不再願意談論六四,那麼它究竟失去了什麼?」鄭麗文訪問美國,對六四隻字不提,國民黨也早已不再像過去那樣發表追責聲明;香港人散落全球、讓世界有了更多小「維園」。
三十七年後,六四最大的變化,是它從一場政治事件的紀念和反思,變成了一場關於記憶的社會實驗。
正如中共在台灣長期進行的認知作戰一樣,真正的政治、體制與價值矛盾,往往被淡化成內部矛盾軟性對待。三十七年來,中共一直沒有主動、積極的對外宣稱鎮壓六四的正當性,官方真正採取的策略並不是說服,而是消失。
六四不被公共討論,最理想的狀態不是讓人民接受官方版本,而是讓人民根本不知道這件事情曾經發生過,與此同時,社會開始主動為六四尋找合理化的解釋。最世俗、最功利,也最符合人們慣性思維的問題,往往是:「有沒有成功?」、「值不值得?」這符合中共「成王敗寇」的歷史觀:誰成功了,誰就正確;誰掌權了,誰就代表歷史規律。
然而,1989年的學生、市民、知識分子、普羅大眾,提出的許多訴求——反腐敗、新聞自由、官員財產公開、政治改革——今天看來並不激進,甚至相當溫和。只問成功,就會遮蔽另一個問題:為什麼會有那麼多人願意走上街頭?這翻開的是歷史沉重的一頁,而這一頁下面,仍埋藏著無數尚未被完整書寫的六四記憶與歷史真相。官方選擇遺忘,社會則開始合理化國家暴力。當人們不再關心開槍是否正當,而只關心開槍是否有效;不再追問責任,而只關心結果,那麼權力甚至不再需要為自己辯護。
也正是在這個意義上,我始終認為,六四最大的後果並不只是1989年6月4日那一天究竟死了多少人。更深遠的影響,是1989年之後逐漸形成的一種政治邏輯:權力可以不被追究,國家可以不必認錯。當一個政府可以對自己的人民使用武力而無須承擔政治責任,它也就可以在未來的許多問題上拒絕承擔責任。
從香港、新疆、西藏,到維權律師、新聞自由、上訪制度乃至龐大的維穩體系,都能看到這種邏輯的延續。六四真正留下的,不只是歷史傷痕,而是一種治理模式——國家學會了永遠不認錯,而且永遠不需要認錯。
今天,官方幾乎已不再回應六四。因為他發現,爭論本身就會讓事件存在。很多人未必相信六四鎮壓是正確的,但他們相信討論無用、改變不了現實、不要影響發展。久而久之就形成一種犬儒共識,這種共識甚至比意識形態更穩固。
因此,六四今天真正面對的敵人,未必只是審查。
官方只是把門關上。
而剩下的遺忘,正在由整個社會自己完成。
June 4th at 37: An Ongoing Experiment in Social Forgetting
First published in the Liberty Times | June 18, 2026
The 37th anniversary of June 4th falls in the first year that AI has fully entered everyday life. Social media algorithms push the newest, hottest and most controversial content in front of everyone. So over these past few days, every time I refreshed the page, I saw people in different languages and different places discussing, once again, this history from 37 years ago.
“Teacher Li” launched the hashtag “#the June 4th you’ve never seen,” showing many young people, for the first time, photos that never appeared in their textbooks. In Japan, Li Houchen, Jia Jia and Wu Lei kept returning to the same question in their discussion: “If a society no longer wants to talk about June 4th, what exactly has it lost?” Cheng Li-wun visited the United States without saying a word about June 4th, and the Kuomintang long ago stopped issuing statements demanding accountability as it once did. Meanwhile, Hong Kongers scattered across the globe have given the world many more small “Victoria Parks.”
Thirty-seven years on, the biggest change to June 4th is that it has gone from the commemoration of, and reflection on, a political event to a social experiment about memory.
Just as with the cognitive warfare the CCP has long waged against Taiwan, real conflicts of politics, institutions and values are often watered down and handled softly as internal disagreements. For 37 years, the CCP has never actively or proactively claimed to the outside world that the June 4th crackdown was justified. The strategy the authorities have actually adopted is not persuasion, but disappearance.
When June 4th is kept out of public discussion, the ideal outcome is not that people accept the official version, but that they never know it happened at all. At the same time, society begins to look for rationalizations of June 4th on its own. The most worldly, most utilitarian questions — the ones that best fit people’s habits of thought — tend to be: “Did it succeed?” “Was it worth it?” This fits the CCP’s view of history, in which the winners are kings and the losers are bandits: whoever succeeds is right, and whoever holds power represents the laws of history.
Yet many of the demands raised in 1989 by students, residents, intellectuals and ordinary people — fighting corruption, press freedom, public disclosure of officials’ assets, political reform — do not look radical today; they look rather moderate. Asking only whether it succeeded hides another question: why were so many people willing to take to the streets? That opens a heavy page of history, and beneath it lie countless memories and truths of June 4th that have yet to be fully written. The authorities choose to forget, and society begins to rationalize state violence. When people no longer care whether the shooting was justified, only whether it was effective; when they no longer ask who is responsible, only what the result was, then power no longer even needs to defend itself.
It is in this sense that I have always believed the greatest consequence of June 4th is not only how many people died on June 4, 1989. Its deeper legacy is a political logic that gradually took shape after 1989: power need not be held to account, and the state need never admit it was wrong. When a government can use force against its own people without bearing any political responsibility, it can refuse responsibility on many other questions in the future.
From Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet to rights lawyers, press freedom, the petitioning system and the vast “stability maintenance” apparatus, you can see this logic carried forward. What June 4th truly left behind is not only a historical wound but a mode of governance — the state learned never to admit wrongdoing, and that it never needs to.
Today, the authorities barely respond to June 4th anymore, because they have found that argument itself keeps the event alive. Many people do not necessarily believe the crackdown was right, but they believe discussing it is useless, that it cannot change reality, and that it should not get in the way of development. Over time this hardens into a cynical consensus — one that is even more stable than ideology.
So the real enemy June 4th faces today may not be censorship alone.
The authorities merely closed the door.
The rest of the forgetting is being done by society itself.


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